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Abstract: The United Malays National Organisation (UMNO) and its al-
lies in the Barisan Nasional (BN) coalition, known as the Alliance until 
1974, dominated Malaysian elections for more than six decades. UMNO’s 
winning formula was based on massive support for the politically domi-
nant Malay community, and mobilising government institutions in support 
of the party. This was undermined towards the end of the 1990s by 
UMNO disunity, a strengthened civil society, and arrival of a digital media. 
Demands for comprehensive political and economic reforms (reformasi) 
emerged following the controversial sacking of Deputy Prime Minister 
Anwar Ibrahim in 1998. UMNO had its worst result ever in the 1999 elec-
tion, a trend that continued in 2008 and 2013 when BN lost its popular 
and two-thirds majority. Najib’s attempt to reverse this by strengthening 
the call for Malay dominance and tightening coercion failed. His deep im-
plication in multiple corruption cases, tactical campaign errors, and a 
united opposition, Pakatan Harapan, led to the BN’s stunning defeat. 
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May 9 and May 10 are transformational dates in Malaysia’s political history. 
The general election begun on 10 May 1969 is linked to the traumatic racial 
riots of 13 May. This in turn led to a move away from an inherited West-
minster-style democracy with broad racial equality in a secular state, to a 
Malay dominated semi-democracy that moved ever closer to an Islamic 
state. The 9 May 2018 general election (GE14) saw the ruling National 
Front (Barisan Nasional or BN), dominated by the United Malays Na-
tional Organisation (UMNO), lose power for the first time since inde-
pendence in 1957. This has revived the possibility of democracy as con-
ceived in the 1957 constitution.1 
Prime Minister Najib Razak approached this election determined to 
improve on his disappointing 2013 result, when BN failed to secure two-
thirds of the seats and for the first time lost the popular vote. Indeed, his 
own position as prime minister and UMNO president depended on this. 
Previous UMNO leaders, including Tunku Abdul Rahman, Mahathir Mo-
hamad, and Abdullah Badawi, were all forced out in anticipation of or after 
poor electoral performances. Najib’s approach was to enhance support by 
winning over the politically dominant Malay electorate. He not only failed 
to do this – largely because of corruption scandals and an unwillingness to 
address political reform – but in the process also alienated a still influential 
non-Malay vote and lost support in the once “fixed deposit” states of Sa-
bah and Sarawak. 
UMNO and its BN allies, known as the Alliance until 1974, domi-
nated Malaysian elections before 2018. Until 2008 the Alliance won elec-
tions with a two-thirds majority, enabling it to strengthen its position fur-
ther by changing the constitution at will. Even after it had lost this majority 
and then the popular vote, it still won large simple majorities. That was 
widely expected to continue after a re-delineation of constituencies in 2018 
provided further advantages to BN. 
The parliamentary seats won in the lower house by the Alliance and 
the BN from the time of the election for home rule in 1955 are as follows 
(see Table 1). 
 

1  I have examined the original independence agreement, and UMNO’s subsequent 
development, in Funston (2018a). Much of the detail in the subsequent pages is 
drawn from this article. 
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Election 
Year 
Alliance/ 
BN 
 Others  Total 
 No. of seats % of 
votes 
No. of 
seats 
% of votes No. of 
seats 
1955 51 81.7 1 18.3 52 
1959 74 51.7 30 48.3 104 
1964 89 58.5 15 41.5 104 
1969 92 47.6 52 52.4 144 
1974 135 60.7 19 39.3 154 
1978 130 57.2 24 42.8 154 
1982 132 60.5 22 39.5 154 
1986 148 55.8 29 41.5 177 
1990 127 53.4 53 46.6 180 
1995 162 65.2 30 34.8 192 
1999 148 56.5 45 40.3 193 
2004 199 64 20 36 219 
2008 140 50.9 82 47.9 222 
2013 133 47.4 89 50.9 222 
6RXUFH (OHFWLRQ&RPPLVVLRQVWDWLVWLFV
1RWH )RUWKRVHHOHFWLRQVZKHUH%1IDFHGDXQLWHGRSSRVLWLRQ±LQDQG
±RQO\WKHSHUFHQWDJHRIYRWHVIRUWKLVRSSRVLWLRQDOOLDQFHLVOLVWHG
9RODWLOLW\LQWKH0DOD\(OHFWRUDWH
Although there have been times when the Alliance/BN electoral domi-
nance has been overwhelming, overall it has not been as complete as sta-
tistics might suggest. There has in fact been considerable volatility, often 
led or reinforced by the politically dominant Malay community. Examples 
include the following:  
 In the 1959 election, feeling ignored by post-independence economic 
and educational policies, approximately 50 per cent of Malays voted 
for the Pan Malayan Islamic Party (PAS), giving it 13 parliamentary 
seats and control of two state governments: Kelantan and Tereng-
ganu.  
 A decade later Malay support for PAS was at a similar level, for the 
same reasons. PAS gained 12 parliamentary seats, won the state as-
sembly convincingly in Kelantan and fell just short in Terengganu 
(11of 24 seats). Non-Malay voters helped the opposition secure as-
sembly wins in Penang and Perak, and equal seats in Selangor. Tech-
nically, the Alliance failed to win 50 per cent of the popular vote or 
secure a two-thirds parliamentary majority, but it did both three days 
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after voting concluded when a minor Sarawak party agreed to join 
the Alliance coalition.2 
 In 1999, the non-Malay electorate handed the BN a comfortable win 
(148 of 193 seats), but UMNO had its worst result ever. For the first 
time the BN faced a united Alternative Front (Barisan Alternatif) that 
brought together the main opposition parties: the predominantly Chi-
nese Democratic Action Party (DAP), the Malay-Islamist PAS, and 
the new interracial National Justice Party (Parti Keadilan Nasional, 
Keadilan or PKN) linked to former deputy prime minister Anwar 
Ibrahim. In the wake of Mahathir’s sacking and jailing of Anwar, and 
the arrival of the reformasi movement, UMNO’s parliamentary seats 
declined from 94 (89 elected in 1995) to 72. PAS achieved its best 
result ever, winning 27 seats, and as part of the Alternative Front re-
tained power in Kelantan and regained Terengganu. Less than half 
the Malay vote went to UMNO, with some accounts suggesting this 
was below 40 per cent.3 
 In 2008, DAP, PAS, and Keadilan cooperated in a loose coalition. 
They won 82 parliamentary seats, leaving the government with 140, 
short of the important two-thirds majority. Opposition parties also 
won power in five states (Kelantan, Kedah, Penang, Selangor, and 
Perak – although they soon lost the latter when three assemblyper-
sons changed sides). Having achieving its best result ever in the pre-
ceding 2004 election, BN slumped to its worst result ever. 
 In 2013, the same three opposition parties united as the People’s Al-
liance (Pakatan Rakyat, PR) won 89 seats, again leaving BN short of 
a two-thirds majority. More importantly, PR won the popular vote 
with 50.9 per cent to the BN’s 47.4 per cent. At the state level, it lost 
Kedah and Terengganu but maintained its hold over Kelantan, Pe-
nang, and Selangor. Najib blamed the result on a “Chinese tsunami,” 
but in both 2008 and 2013 urban Malays also made a major contri-
bution to opposition gains. 
In 2018, the BN faced the Alliance of Hope (Pakatan Harapan, PH) – a 
coalition of DAP; the People’s Justice Party (Parti Keadilan Rakyat – 

2  Before post-election realignments the Alliance obtained 48.6 percent of the vote 
for the peninsula, and 47.6 percent for Malaysia as a whole. But the reality of 
support for the Alliance was greater, because in the areas where it had strong 
support it won nine peninsula seats and 20 Malaysia-wide seats that were uncon-
tested. See Funston (2018b: 50–51). 
3  Datuk Azmi Khalid, minister for rural development, reported in Berita Harian 
(2000). Also, Kamarudin Jaffar has estimated 70 per cent of Malays voted against 
UMNO. Cited in Roslan (2001: 20). 
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Keadilan or PKR, a reiteration of the earlier PKN); the Malaysian United 
Indigenous Party (Parti Pribumi Bersatu Malaysia, Bersatu or PPBM), a 
breakaway from UMNO established in September 2016; and the National 
Trust Party (Parti Amanah Nasional, Amanah or PAN), a breakaway from 
PAS established September 2015. Separately, the Sabah Heritage Party 
(Parti Warisan Sabah, Warisan), established as a breakaway from UMNO 
in October 2016, agreed to work with PH without becoming a member. 
This unlikely alliance exceeded previous opposition efforts, winning both 
a simple majority and a much higher percentage of the popular vote than 
BN and new rival PAS. UMNO’s and the BN’s positions soon weakened 
further as parliamentarians resigned and coalition partners declared inde-
pendence. Details of the election outcome are discussed in more detail 
below. 
How was it that the UMNO-led coalition remained so dominant for 
more than 60 years in the face of electoral volatility? What circumstances 
led to its crushing defeat in 2018? And what part did the Malay electorate 
play in this election? 
8012¶V:LQQLQJ)RUPXOD
They key to the BN’s long-term electoral dominance lies in the far-reach-
ing changes introduced after the riots of 13 May 1969. Following 21 
months’ rule by an appointed National Operations Council (NOC) made 
up of eight Malays and only two non-Malays, parliamentary democracy 
resumed accompanied by changes that made Malaysia more Malay- and 
UMNO-oriented, more corporatist, and less democratic. Interpreting the 
causes of 13 May as Malay insecurities over non-Malay economic and po-
litical gains, government leaders sought resolution by mobilising state re-
sources to assist Malays and other indigenous groups (collectively known 
as bumiputera), revitalising and entrenching UMNO’s position as the dom-
inant party, and enhancing UMNO control over the state. 
The New Economic Policy (NEP), implemented in 1971, ostensibly 
sought to eliminate poverty irrespective of race, and to restructure the 
economy so that race would not be identified with economic function. In 
practice it became a vehicle for UMNO to oversee a massive transfer of 
state funds to Malays. Private companies had to set aside 30 per cent of 
shares for bumiputeras. Foreign companies had to have bumiputera partners. 
Government-linked companies (GLCs), including banks, had to give pref-
erence to bumiputera businessmen. Large companies had to have senior 
bumiputera executives and at least 30 per cent bumiputera employees. Bumi-
putera contractors serviced all government contracts up to MYR 200,000 
  62 John Funston 

(Class F contractors), and were given informal preference for larger con-
tracts. A separate ministry devoted to bumiputera economic development 
was established to channel funds into training, credit, and other assistance. 
A government-run unit trust scheme provided a risk-free investment op-
tion that paid well above commercial rates. Such policies were supple-
mented by expanding bumiputera educational opportunities through quotas 
for higher education and increased scholarships, and expanding employ-
ment in the public service. 
The 13 May riots also led to a new policy of asserting unambiguously 
that political power must rest predominantly with Malays through UMNO. 
The party set about achieving this by using its new-found wealth for po-
litical patronage; revising its constitution to provide a more modern frame-
work; reorganising alliances with other political parties formerly in the op-
position (leading to the formation of the BN in 1974); and strengthening 
its control over the bureaucracy, the parliament, and eventually also the 
judiciary. 
The NEP, and high growth rates for most of the 1970s through to 
the 1990s, provided an almost unlimited source of funds for political pat-
ronage, with which UMNO could exert financial control over Malays and 
offer appealing handouts during elections. At the same time, however, it 
led to major financial scandals, particularly as UMNO expanded its own 
direct business role. It also fuelled growing conflict within UMNO as vote 
buying expanded rapidly to win party office and gain access to new party 
and government funds. UMNO became known as a party of warlords, 
with heads of the 191 divisions and a small number of others controlling 
the party by dispensing financial favours. Eventually, however, this also 
led to the emergence of a new Malay middle class critical of corruption, 
the absence of democracy, and other perceived UMNO shortcomings. 
UMNO revised its constitution following the 13 Malay riots, concen-
trating power more directly in the hands of the party leader and the party 
executive. Later amendments, such as those made after the disastrous 
1999 general election, took this process even further and made it difficult 
for the party to hold its leaders to account. 
The formation of the BN broadened the ruling alliance, strengthen-
ing UMNO’s dominance over coalition partners and the public at large. 
This proved particularly useful in Sabah and Sarawak, where the incorpo-
ration of former party foes helped ensure an important two-thirds major-
ity after the 1969 election. In subsequent years this, and the successful 
establishment of an UMNO presence in Sabah in 1991, brought the two 
states into the BN fold so successfully that they repeatedly returned mas-
sive BN electoral wins and became known as the BN’s “fixed deposit,” 
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which was particularly important because the two states are over-repre-
sented in terms of population and account for some 25 per cent of parlia-
mentary seats. 
By 1969 the bureaucracy was already a predominantly bumiputera in-
stitution, with a four-to-one ratio at the top levels. But by 2005, in a much 
expanded service, Malays at the “highest management level” numbered 84 
per cent, and another 1.4 per cent were other indigenous; Chinese ac-
counted for only 9.3 per cent, and Indians 5.1 per cent (Centre for Public 
Policy Studies 2006). Among the lower ranks the bumiputera component 
was even larger. At the same time the government ensured that bureau-
cratic leaders served UMNO interests. New organisations were established 
to secure control over the population at large, such as Kemas (Bahagian 
Kemajuan Masyarakat), the Social Development Division in the Rural De-
velopment Ministry (established in 1970), and the citizen’s military Rela 
(Jabatan Sukarelawan Malaysia), which was founded in 1972. The Village 
Security and Development Committees (Jawatankuasa Kemajuan dan 
Keselamatan Kampung, or JKKK), established in the 1960s to act as the 
eyes and ears of the government, were expanded and provided with more 
resources.  
Some bureaucratic agencies had a particularly direct influence on 
elections, including, notably, the Election Commission (EC), which was 
responsible for delineating constituencies, maintaining an electoral role, 
and conducting elections. Supposedly an independent organisation, but 
falling under the Prime Minister’s Department, and with all seven mem-
bers appointed by the prime minister, it essentially promoted UMNO’s 
interests (Ostwald 2017; see also Lim Teck Gee 2018). In 2013 outgoing 
EC head Tan Sri Abdul Rashid Abdul Rahman declared that over several 
elections he had ensured Malays remained in power.4 Several legislative 
changes essentially removed opportunities to challenge EC decisions, in-
cluding a 2002 amendment that precluded any legal challenge to the elec-
toral roll once this had been gazetted (Funston 2006: 141). In addition, the 
final decision on any re-delineation was in the hands of the prime minister 
and parliament. 
The Registrar of Societies (ROS) also played an important role, since 
its approval was necessary for political parties to compete in elections. 
ROS has had a tradition of making life difficult for opposition parties. In 
the run up to the 2013 elections it kept everyone guessing until the last 

4  Muzliza Mustafa (2013). I have documented numerous examples of EC inter-
vention to assist UMNO and the BN in the 2004 election (Funston 2006: partic-
ularly 141–142, and 149–151).  
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moment before allowing DAP to participate under its own banner, and 
refused to recognise the opposition Pakatan Rakyat coalition as a party. 
Several agencies were involved in the selective prosecution of the op-
position, or in making decisions favouring the BN government. The at-
torney-general has exclusive powers to prosecute or not, and on several 
occasions pressed charges against opposition members while not proceed-
ing against BN – notably in the decision to exonerate Najib in relation to 
reports of money paid into his private bank account from firms related to 
1 Malaysia Development Berhad (1MDB). Police also followed a similar 
path, with recent leaders seen as personally close to Najib. The Malaysian 
Anti-Corruption Commission (MACC), the head of which is appointed by 
the prime minister and reports to the prime minister, also generally ful-
filled government wishes, taking tough and immediate action against op-
position members while stalling or exonerating BN leaders. When, how-
ever, an attorney-general and some members of the MACC threatened to 
act against Najib over 1MDB they were dismissed, transferred, or pres-
sured to retire.5 
After Mahathir’s sacking of Malaysia’s top judge in 1988, the judiciary 
also largely deferred to government wishes. In a number of controversial 
cases judges were in complete agreement with the government in the face 
of almost universal scepticism. The two cases against Anwar Ibrahim are 
the best known examples of judges taking decisions that were broadly con-
demned by critics such as the Bar Council in Malaysia and international 
legal experts (Trowell 2012, 2015).6 
With a comfortable majority in parliament, the then BN government 
had no difficulty pushing through its legislative agenda. Key legislation on 
a wide range of issues, including security matters, was presented at short 
notice (sometimes only a day before) and rushed through in a few hours 
– notwithstanding a promise by Najib to allow adequate public consulta-
tion on all important legislation.7 

5  Controversial MACC head prior to the GE14, Dzulkifli Ahmad, was strongly 
criticised by PH members for actions considered favourable to the BN, and was 
one of the first forced to resign after the PH took power. His successor spoke 
emotionally about the pressure put on him and others to stop investigations into 
Najib’s involvement with 1MDB (New Straits Times 2018). Prime Minister Ma-
hathir subsequently announced that the MACC would be shifted from the Prime 
Minister’s Department to parliament (Aziz 2018). 
6  Mark Trowell was a trial observer for the Geneva-based Inter-Parliamentary Un-
ion and various international legal organisations. 
7  In February 2012, Najib promised that all draft law changes would be available 
on the website of the ministry concerned so that public opinion could be taken 
into account (Utusan Malaysia 2012). 
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Finally, during its rule the BN maintained and extended its control 
over the mainstream media. Television and radio were largely government 
owned, and what private ownership there was belonged in most cases to 
UMNO-linked companies. All of the mainstream print media outlets were 
owned by BN-linked companies. UMNO went into the media business as 
early as 1961, when it took over the leading Malay-medium daily, Utusan 
Melayu. It expanded its role further in 1972 when it purchased the major 
English paper the Straits Times (soon cut from its Singapore base and re-
branded as the New Straits Times), as well as acquiring the Malay-language 
offshoot Berita Harian. 
7KH&KDOOHQJHWR8012¶V:LQQLQJ)RUPXOD
By the late 1990s a series of events undermined UMNO’s winning formula. 
The early 1990s had been a period of remarkable economic growth, ex-
ceeding 8 per cent per annum, in Malaysia. This growth created a new, 
more critical middle class – Malay and non-Malay – which made its pres-
ence felt in both UMNO and society as a whole, particularly after the 
Asian financial crisis that began when Thailand floated its currency on 2 
July 1997. These changes divided UMNO, civil society became a more 
influential political player, and the digital media began to challenge the 
mainstream media. 
Within UMNO, Anwar Ibrahim’s attempts to address problems of 
corruption while Mahathir was on leave in early 1997 provoked strong 
opposition within the party. Anwar was accused of sodomy, eventually 
sacked as deputy prime minister and then as an UMNO member, and 
jailed for alleged abuse of power. He experienced a near-fatal assault by 
the head of police at the time of his arrest in September 1998, and the 
court proceedings that followed were widely regarded as shambolic. This 
divided UMNO deeply. While the top party leadership remained largely 
intact, tens of thousands of members left the party, including many of its 
most talented younger leaders. UMNO arguably never recovered from this. 
The party divided again in 2016 when several leaders quit the party, in-
cluding Mahathir, Deputy President Muhyiddin Yassin, and Vice President 
Shafie Apal, over the 1MDB scandal.  
The ramifications of the Asian financial crisis extended beyond 
UMNO. From the beginning of 1997, civil society critics began to ques-
tion economic policies that had been successful in promoting economic 
growth but had also promoted corruption and authoritarian rule. Critics 
called for reformasi – addressing problems with increased democracy and 
transparency, and opposing corruption, cronyism, and nepotism. After 
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Anwar’s arrest in September 1998, numerous NGOs representing profes-
sional, human rights, and Islamic groups joined protests, acting through 
several united fronts, particularly the Pergerakan Keadilan Sosial (Social 
Justice Movement) also known as ADIL (Justice), which was launched on 
10 December. ADIL was headed by Anwar’s wife, Dr. Wan Azizah Wan 
Ismail, and its 27 committee members and 24 “supporters” read like a 
who’s who of Malaysian NGO movements and academia. ADIL later 
morphed into the political party now known as Keadilan or PKR, but civil 
society groups continued to be active, particularly through the Coalition 
for Clean and Fair Elections (Gabungan Pilihanraya Bersih dan Adil, or 
Bersih) established in 2005. 
Digital media made a mark at the time of Anwar’s sacking and sub-
sequent trial. The 1999 election was the first to be influenced by a new, 
critical online media and a wide range of blogs. 
These three factors led to the disastrous (for UMNO) 1999 election, 
and a steady decline in support for UMNO and BN thereafter. The 2004 
election was an exception, because the then unpopular Mahathir had re-
signed, and Abdullah Badawi promised to implement the reformasi agenda 
himself by reforming UMNO and mounting a campaign against corrup-
tion. He failed to deliver. UMNO remained divided and unwilling to re-
form, and increasingly resorted to an ultranationalist agenda – symbolised 
by the antics of then youth leader Hishammuddin Hussein unsheathing a 
Malay keris (dagger) at three consecutive assemblies between 2005 and 
2007. (Hishammuddin later acknowledged that this had cost non-Malay 
votes.) Two further developments were important in the lead up to the 
2008 election: the establishment of Bersih in 2005 and then of the Indian 
rights organisation Hindraf in June 2007, following controversial conver-
sions of Hindus to Islam and the demolition of several Hindu temples. 
Large demonstrations by Bersih on 10 November 2007 and Hindraf on 
25 November, each numbering 20,000 or more in spite of the government 
declaring them illegal and seeking to prevent them, have been widely cred-
ited with contributing to government electoral setbacks in 2008.  
UMNO followed the same path under Najib’s leadership from 2009 
to 2013. Najib spoke of the need to reform UMNO but did not make the 
changes necessary to achieve this. UMNO conflicts were papered over 
and the party became more nationalistic, notwithstanding a 1Malaysia slo-
gan that explicitly included non-Malays as well. Civil society groups in-
creased opposition to the government, particularly Bersih, which reorgan-
ised to become a completely non-government organisation in 2009. Two 
more Bersih rallies in 2011 and 2012 – again declared illegal by the gov-
ernment – maintained the pressure. The BN vote decreased further in 
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2013. UMNO increased its seats from 79 to 88, but its share of the vote 
remained much the same, with at best a marginal increase.8 
5HVWRULQJ8012¶V'RPLQDQFH±
1DMLE¶V6WUDWHJ\IRUWKH*(
Buoyed by increased seats for UMNO in 2013, Najib apparently con-
cluded that support from the Malay electorate was critical to success in the 
GE14. He moved to divide the opposition by cooperating closely with 
PAS (leading PAS to largely withdraw from the opposition Pakatan Rakyat 
coalition in 2015), ensured that opposition leader Anwar went to jail on 
trumped up sodomy charges, investigated and sometimes charged numer-
ous other political opponents on equally spurious charges, blocked or har-
assed critical web sites, and strengthened legislation to obtain greater 
power against his opponents. 
The efforts to divide the opposition began immediately after the 2013 
election, with proposals for an UMNO-PAS Unity Government in Selan-
gor and Perak states. When PAS, under the influence of its Mursyidul Am 
(Spiritual Leader) Nik Aziz Nik Mat, rejected these overtures, Najib prom-
ised sympathetic consideration of PAS plans to introduce Islamic criminal 
law (hudud). In March 2014 the minister in charge of Islamic affairs in the 
Prime Minister’s Department told parliament that the government would 
help PAS revise its hudud law in Kelantan, and assist with amending ena-
bling federal legislation. Najib then allowed PAS leader Haji Abdul Hadi 
bin Awang to present a private members bill to parliament to amend Act 
355 – an important step towards hudud.9 In December 2015 Najib and 

8  Wikipedia is generally reliable on election statistics, but is not accurate in this 
case. It records UMNO’s vote in 2008 as 2,381,725 or 29.98 per cent, and 
3,252,484 or 29.42 per cent in 2013. Yet as a proportion of the votes cast re-
ported by Wikipedia – 8,161,039 in 2008 and 11,257,147 in 2013 – the figures 
should be 29.18 per cent and 28.89 per cent respectively (see reports for 2008 at 
<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Malaysian_general_election,_2008>, and for 
2013 at <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Malaysian_general_election,_2013>). 
However most media reports on the UMNO vote in 2013 put it at 3,416,147 or 
30.4 per cent of the overall vote (see for example Malaysia Today 2013). UMNO 
benefitted from taking over safe BN seats, previously held by the MCA in at least 
three constituencies (ABC News 2013). 
9  In March 2014, the minister in charge of Islamic affairs in the Prime Minister’s 
Department, Jamil Khir, promised to cooperate with PAS to introduce hudud in 
Kelantan – something UMNO had resisted hitherto. After consideration by a 
joint government–PAS technical committee, a new bill was passed in Kelantan, 
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Hadi, dressed in identical pink clothing, jointly headed an Al-Azhar 
Alumni Regional Seminar, during which both sides pledged to work to-
wards Muslim unity. Almost one year later the two presided over a 10,000-
strong rally in support of Burmese Muslim Rohingya refugees. 
These initiatives yielded immediate dividends for Najib. At its assem-
bly in June 2015 the PAS agreed to sever ties with former coalition partner 
DAP over the DAP’s opposition to the pursuit of hudud. The conservative 
wing of PAS gained absolute control over the party, subsequently insisting 
that Malay Muslims must dominate Malaysian politics and attacking the 
DAP as a party that was anti-Muslim. When the Wall Street Journal accused 
Najib of corruption in relation to the 1MDB in July 2015, Hadi came to 
his defence, claiming that four witnesses were necessary (Malaysia Today 
2015), and subsequently rejected such claims as a foreign attempt to inter-
vene in Malaysia’s internal affairs. Sidelined by losing their party functions 
and disagreeing with the new PAS direction, moderates in the party broke 
away to form Amanah in September. 
Najib also ramped up rhetorical support for ketuanan Melayu (Malay 
domination), aligning his rule more closely with the Malay rulers, con-
servative Islamic bureaucracies, and extreme Malay-Muslim NGOs such 
as Perkasa and ISMA (Ikatan Muslimim Malaysia, or Malaysian Muslim 
Solidarity). At international fora he presented himself to the West as a 
leader of Muslim moderates, but at home he sought to enhance his Islamic 
credentials by drawing Malaysia ever closer to conservative Saudi Arabia. 
Malays and Islam, he alleged, were threatened as never before, and Mus-
lims of all political persuasions must unite to prevent this. 
On 10 February 2015, Malaysia’s Federal Court found Anwar Ibra-
him guilty of sodomy in a case which, as noted earlier, was almost univer-
sally seen as based on trumped up charges. Anwar immediately began a 
five-year jail sentence, and with his eligibility to take part in politics limited 
for a further five years beyond the release date, Najib’s greatest rival was 
seemingly blocked for the long term. In addition, dozens of opposition 
leaders, pro-opposition NGOs, and pro-opposition Internet media outlets 
faced spurious police investigations and, often, charges of sedition, libel, 
slander, violations of the Communications and Multimedia Act and of Ma-
laysia’s Security Offences (Special Measures) Act, illegal assembly, and “ac-
tivities detrimental to parliamentary democracy.” Online publications such 

and the same month PAS leader Hadi listed a private members bill for parlia-
mentary consideration, seeking amendment of Act 355 so that Kelantan could 
implement its revised law. UMNO subsequently allowed Hadi to table his bill in 
May and November 2016, and to table and speak to it in April 2017, but fearful 
of non-Muslim opposition it did not allow any parliamentary debate. 
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as Malaysiakini and The Malaysian Insider endured police raids and had 
charges laid against them (eventually forcing the closure of the latter), 
while the crusading London-based Sarawak Report and the moderate Din 
Merican websites were both blocked. 
With Anwar side-lined in jail, Najib launched a sustained attack on 
his remaining key rival Mahathir, blaming him for all the problems in Ma-
laysia, ridiculing the idea of a 92-year-old leading an alliance that aspired 
to defeat the BN government, having the police interrogate his highly re-
spected 91-year-old wife for speaking at a “Women Against Toxic Politics” 
rally on 10 September 2017, constantly threatening legal action against him, 
and even launching a police investigation against him under the Anti-Fake 
News Act for his allegation that a private plane he used for election cam-
paigning appeared to have been sabotaged. On 18 July 2017, in a further 
attempt to discredit both Mahathir and Anwar, the government an-
nounced a Royal Commission of Inquiry into the billions of ringgits in 
losses through forex trading in the 1980s and 1990s. This was widely seen 
as an orchestrated vendetta and an attempt to distract attention from 
Najib’s problems with 1MDB (see for example Minderjeet Kaur 2017). 
Najib also introduced legal changes to enhance executive power. He 
had repealed the notorious Internal Security Act (ISA) in 2012, but several 
“reform” bills introduced in 2011 and 2012 clawed back many earlier pow-
ers vested in several oppressive laws (Whiting 2013). In 2015 he tightened 
executive powers further, toughening the sedition act he had once prom-
ised to abolish (including adding new powers to restrict the online media), 
along with passing the ISA-like Prevention of Terrorism Act, and the Na-
tional Security Council Act giving the prime minister virtually unlimited 
power to declare a state of emergency over part or even all of the country. 
On the eve of the GE14 he passed the Anti-Fake News Act, restricting 
critical comment on any issue deemed offensive by the government. 
0'%6SRLOHU
Najib may well have got away with these changes were it not for the trav-
ails of the state investment fund, 1MDB. By late 2014 media reports had 
emerged of 1MDB debts amounting to some RM40 billion, and the fund’s 
involvement in a range of unorthodox financial transactions. The issue 
escalated when the Wall Street Journal reported on 2 July 2015 that firms 
linked to 1MDB had paid USD 681 million into Najib’s private bank ac-
count. After initial denials, Najib soon acknowledged receiving this sum 
but claimed it was a gift from Saudi royalty to help UMNO in the 2013 
election. Najib then came down hard against 1MDB critics. On 28 July he 
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sacked Deputy Prime Minister and UMNO Deputy President Muhyiddin 
Yassin, along with UMNO Vice-President and Regional Development 
Minister Shafie Apdal. On the same day he sacked the attorney-general, 
Abdul Ghani Patail, who was in the process of preparing 1MDB-related 
charges against Najib, replacing him with former judge and UMNO par-
liamentary candidate Mohamad Apandi Ali. He also took disciplinary ac-
tion against other officials investigating 1MDB; arrested opposition and 
civil society critics for alleged activities “detrimental to parliamentary de-
mocracy”; curtailed the activities of the parliamentary Public Accounts 
Committee, which was enquiring into 1MDB; ensured that the parliamen-
tary speaker shut down questions on 1MDB; and embargoed an auditor-
general report under the Official Secrets Act. In January 2016, Attorney-
General Apandi Ali declared Najib’s story was correct and that there was 
no case against him.  
By the eve of the GE14 many observers believed Najib had got away 
with 1MDB. But the three problem areas identified earlier – UMNO divi-
sions, a strengthened middle class and civil society, and the new digital age 
– were all affected by the 1MDB saga.  
Many of the UMNO rebels, including Mahathir, who resigned from 
the party in February 2016, joined with other opposition parties (except 
PAS) on 4 March 2006 to sign a 37-point People’s Declaration calling for 
Najib’s resignation and institutional change. This was the first coming to-
gether of the groups that later made up the PH, formalised when Bersatu 
joined the coalition on 14 March 2017. Importantly, this represented a 
reconciliation between those allied to Mahathir and Anwar. Within 
UMNO itself, most of the party’s warlords rallied behind Najib, but many 
in the rank and file were not convinced. 
For the broader middle class society, and civil society organisations 
such as Bersih, the 1MDB debacle was a deep affront. Malaysia had be-
come known as an infamous kleptocracy, and its leadership had shamed 
the whole nation. That message was passed widely through an extensive 
social media network.  
7KH&DPSDLJQ
In the weeks immediately before the elections, Najib used the BN’s par-
liamentary majority to rush through a heavily biased re-delineation of par-
liamentary seats. This was designed to increase the influence of Malay elec-
tors – for example Malay majority seats for the 165 peninsula constituen-
cies increased from 116 to 118, while a seat that had been 53 per cent non-
Malay was reconstituted so that Malays and non-Malays were each 50 per 
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cent – and specifically targeted to benefit UMNO and BN.10 The EC also 
brushed aside protests over many irregularities in the electoral roll, and 
refused to gazette over 100,000 enrolments in 2018. Many were convinced 
that these actions alone would ensure a BN win.11 
Najib announced the dissolution of parliament on 6 April, effective 
the following day. On 10 April the EC announced that nominations would 
take place on 28 April, and the elections held on 9 May. The short cam-
paign period and the fact that the vote fell on a Wednesday were both seen 
as helping the BN. This was especially true of the latter, as voters are re-
quired to vote in their constituencies – often far from their workplace – 
and many would be unable to travel mid-week. After an immediate outcry 
the government made a small concession by agreeing to make the election 
day a public holiday. 
As it had in 2013, the BN placed Najib at the forefront of its cam-
paign, flooding the country with large pictures of a smiling, benevolent, 
and almost saintly leader. It made a particular effort to counter opposition 
claims of entrenched corruption, describing these as lies and supporting 
this with a nation-wide roadshow by the CEO of 1MDB, Arul Kanda 
Kandasamy. Otherwise, the BN followed its usual practice of exploiting 
the “three M’s” – money, machinery, and media.  
The BN’s election manifesto, which featured the Trumpesque title 
“Making My Country Great” (Hebatkan Negara Aku), included a number 
of worthy proposals for economic advancement, but promises of eco-
nomic handouts were given prominence and no proposals for addressing 
corruption were included. Cash handouts were a feature of all rallies, as 
were promises of additional generous benefits once the BN had been re-
elected. 
The government machinery was exploited in numerous ways, espe-
cially through interventions by the ROS and the EC. The ROS refused to 
recognise PH as a party and suspended Bersatu on 5 April, though it did 
eventually allow all four PH members to run under the PKR logo. The EC 
placed multiple obstacles in the opposition’s path, including refusing reg-
istration for two prominent PH candidates, outlawing the use of Ma-
hathir’s picture on posters, not allowing the presence of credible external 
monitors, and refusing to allow even the government’s Human Rights 
Commission to act as a monitor. Various senior bureaucrats and GLC 

10  See for example articles by the president of the Malaysian Bar, Varughese (2018), 
Bersih Media Statement (2018), and Welsh (2018b). 
11  See especially two articles in the 8 March edition of The Economist (2018a, 2018b). 
Note also the views of the Merdeka Centre (The Malaysian Insight 2018a), and 
Asila Jalil (2018). 
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leaders were also pressed into BN service, most famously the aforemen-
tioned head of 1MDB. The BN’s own machinery functioned efficiently in 
terms of the usual campaign requirements, such as getting out posters, 
organising rallies, and sending out canvassing agents. 
The BN-controlled mainstream television and print media was mo-
bilised to extol the virtues of the government and highlight the alleged 
duplicity of the opposition. A heavy investment was also made in the cyber 
sphere, after shortcomings in this area were identified as contributing to 
BN setbacks in 2013 elections. The central message was that the Malay 
electorate would face dire threats to its special position, to the Malay rulers, 
and to Islam if the PH – allegedly dominated by the Chinese-led DAP – 
were to take power. Non-Malays were simply warned that if they did not 
support the BN their interests could not be looked after by a future BN 
government. Voters should stay with a proven brand. 
The PH, by contrast, focused on the rising cost of living for the less 
well-to-do (linked particularly to a newly imposed and unpopular GST of 
6 per cent), together with issues of corruption (1MDB was the most egre-
gious case but there were numerous others, including those involving the 
Federal Land Development Authority (FELDA); the institution support-
ing Malay entrepreneurship, MARA (Majlis Amanah Rakyat, People’s 
Trust Council); the defence and youth ministries; and long-standing cases 
involving the purchase of French submarines and a cattle project involving 
the family of the head of UMNO’s women’s wing) and the need for whole-
sale government reform along the lines advocated by reformasi in the 1990s. 
Its election manifesto, the Book of Hope (Buku Harapan), combined eco-
nomic populism with a wide array of changes to democratise Malaysia’s 
institutions and make them more accountable. Among the promises were 
the following: 
 Limiting the prime minister’s tenure to two terms, and reducing his 
or her power by prohibiting the holding of additional portfolios and 
reducing the size of the Prime Minister’s Department (PMD) 
 Restoring the authority of parliament 
 Ensuring transparent and efficient elections 
 Reforming the bureaucracy and institutions such as the MACC (in-
cluding making this body accountable to parliament rather than to 
the PMD) 
 Reforming the police force through measures such as an Independ-
ent Police Complaint and Misconduct Commission (a centrepiece of 
proposals by a Royal Commission in May 2005)  
 Enhancing federalism by properly implementing the 1963 Malaysia 
Agreement with Sabah and Sarawak 
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 Reforming the justice system via reforms to the judiciary and the at-
torney-general’s department, and by abolishing or amending oppres-
sive laws  
The PH was in no position to match the BN in terms of the three M’s, 
but it compensated for this through the mass mobilisation of supporters 
for canvassing, the efficient use of digital media to get its message out, and 
popular rallies which built momentum in the final campaign stages. 
7KH5HVXOWV
A short account of the election outcome is contained in the following table: 
7DEOH*(2YHUYLHZ
Parties Won Contesting % popular vote 
BN 79 222 33.7 
UMNO 54 122 20.6 
PH 113 222 48 
PKR 47 72 17.1 
DAP 42 47 17.4 
Bersatu 13 52 5.8 
Amanah 11 34 5.4 
Warisan 8 17 2.3 
PAS 18 157 16.9 
Independent 4 29 0.9 
6RXUFH (OHFWLRQ&RPPLVVLRQVWDWLVWLFV
These figures reveal a stunning reversal of fortunes for the two contestants. 
On election night the BN won only 79 seats, down from 133 in 2013. The 
PH and Warisan won 121 seats, up from the previous opposition’s 89. In 
all, the BN lost 54 seats and the PH gained 32. In 2013, the BN’s share of 
the popular vote reached a new low of 47.4 per cent, but in GE14 it de-
clined much further to 33.7 per cent. The PH’s share of the popular vote 
remained steady at over 50 per cent, if Warisan and pro-independent rep-
resentatives are taken into account. The BN won the popular vote in only 
one state, Sarawak (52.5 per cent). It experienced losses across the board, 
but particularly in the Malay heartland areas of Kedah and Johor, and Sa-
bah, as the following table reveals. 
 
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7DEOH%13DUOLDPHQWDU\6HDWVE\6WDWH 
BN 2013 2018 Loss 
Perlis 3 2 1 
Kedah 10 2 8 
Kelantan 5 5 0 
Terengganu 4 2 2 
Penang 3 2 1 
Perak 12 11 1 
Pahang 10 9 1 
Selangor 5 2 3 
FT-KL & Putrajaya 3 1 2 
Negri Sembilan 5 3 2 
Malacca 4 2 2 
Johor 21 8 13 
Sabah & FT Labuan 23 11 12 
Sarawak 25 19 6 
Total 133 79 54 
 
State assembly elections, held simultaneously in 12 of Malaysia’s 13 states, 
showed a similar trend. The BN went from controlling nine states to only 
two (Pahang and the small state of Perlis). 
The BN’s position was soon weakened further by the withdrawal of 
coalition partners and three UMNO resignations. By the time parliament 
resumed in July, the BN was left with the original pre-BN Alliance of 
UMNO, MCA, and MIC, and had only 54 members in the 222-seat par-
liament (two contributed by MIC and one by MCA). By October another 
three UMNO MPs had resigned, followed by five more from Sabah on 12 
December, and six more from the peninsula on 14 December.12  

12  The UMNO members of parliament who have resigned since the general elec-
tion are Noor Azmi Ghazali Azmi, who quit on 24 June; Syed Abu Hussin Hafiz 
Abdul Fasal, 27 June; former head of the Women’s Youth section (Puteri 
UMNO) Mas Ermieyati Samsudin, 1 July; former trade minister and UMNO 
leader in Kelantan Mustapha Mohamad, 18 September; former minister of for-
eign affairs Anifah Aman, 19 September; Labuan representative Datuk Rozman 
Isli, 11 October; Sabah MPs Abdul Rahim Bakri, Datuk Azizah Mohd Dun, Ya-
mani Hafez Musa,Datuk Ronald Kiandee and Datuk Zakaria Mohd Edris, all on 
12 December; and former domestic trade, cooperatives and consumerism min-
ister Hamzah Zainudin, along with Rosol Wahid, Shabudin Yahaya, Mohd Faisah 
Mohd Fakeh, Latiff Ahmad and Ikmal Hisham, all on 14 December. At the time 
of writing Noor Azmi, Mas Ermieyati and Mustapha had joined Bersatu, Rozman 
joined Warisan, while the rest declared support for the PH government but opted 
to become independent. 
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Despite the BN’s humiliation, UMNO leaders, and some analysts, 
have argued that the results were neither a rejection of UMNO nor evi-
dence of a shift in the Malay electorate. UMNO’s information head, An-
nuar Musa, declared that UMNO had obtained 60 per cent of the Malay-
Muslim vote (The Malaysian Insight 2018b). Former prime minister Najib 
stated that there was no Malay tsunami against UMNO in GE14, only a 
divided Malay electorate (Malaysiakini 2018b). The current UMNO head 
and former deputy prime minister, Zahid Hamidi, claimed that UMNO 
still had strong Malay support of 46 per cent, and that it was “higher than 
the previous elections” (Chan Kok Leong 2018). With 54 seats on election 
night, UMNO remained the largest single party in parliament. 
Among analysts, one has claimed that UMNO enjoyed the support 
of 46.29 per cent of the Malay electorate, compared to 28.14 for PAS and 
25.47 for PH-Warisan (D A H Ikhwan 2018). A widely quoted survey by 
the respected Merdeka Centre put Malay support for the PH and Warisan 
at only 25–30 per cent, while the PAS was said to have received 30–33 per 
cent and UMNO 35–40 per cent (see for instance, Malay Mail 2018).  
While a precise measurement of UMNO’s support from the Malay 
electorate is difficult to make without a detailed examination of individual 
constituencies, these figures misrepresent the movement away from 
UMNO and the critical role of the Malay electorate in supporting PH. The 
15 per cent decline in UMNO seats from 88 to 54 (37 after subsequent 
resignations) was by far its worst result ever. In 1999 – when UMNO 
probably gained the support of less than 40 per cent of the Malay elec-
torate – its decline was only 9 per cent, from 89 to 72 seats in a 193 seat 
parliament. 
Several other indicators emphasise the Malay shift from UMNO. Its 
total vote in an expanded electorate declined from 3,416,310 of 11,257,147 
(30.4 per cent of the popular vote) in 2013 to 2,533,234 of 12,299,514 in 
GE14 (20.6 per cent).13 Of the 188 Malay majority constituencies in pen-
insular Malaysia, the PH won 55 (PKR 30, PPBM 13, PAN 11, DAP 1) to 
the UMNO’s 46; and an electorate with 50 per cent Malays was also won 
by the PH (PKR). In earlier elections the UMNO had lost only six to seven 
of 54 rural constituencies with FELDA development schemes, while in 

13  As previously noted (footnote 8), the total UMNO vote in 2013 is taken from 
several media reports. See for example Malaysia Today (2013). The figure for 2018 
is my own calculation, based on figures provided by the Election Commission 
and Malaysiakini’s <https://undi.info/>. Wikipedia has a slightly higher figure 
of 2,548,251 (<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Malaysian_general_election, 
2018>). 
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2018 it lost 19.14 There is also evidence that Malay bureaucrats and police 
and army members abandoned UMNO in significant numbers.15  
Even these figures may flatter UMNO. On election night the EC de-
clared the voter turnout to be 76 per cent, but revised this by more than 6 
per cent to 82.32 per cent two days later (The Star 2018b). No explanation 
for this extraordinary difference was given, but the EC’s past record sug-
gests that the figures may have been adjusted to strengthen the 
UMNO/BN vote. And with only 37 parliamentarians now remaining, 
UMNO is smaller than the PKR, which has 50 members following the 
joining of three independents. 
UMNO was still able to gain support in some rural areas, which now 
account for approximately 20 per cent of the Malay electorate. Voting data 
in the Perak constituency of Sungai Siput, for instance, showed that 
UMNO won 52 per cent of the rural Malay vote, a result likely replicated 
in several similar constituencies (Free Malaysia Today 2018a). But PAS won 
the rural Malay vote in the east coast states of Kelantan and Terengganu, 
while PH won the more urbanised constituencies for the rest of the pen-
insula. 
The vote for PAS should not be considered anything but a rejection 
of UMNO. With widespread speculation that UMNO was about to win 
the state of Kelantan, PAS electors united against the traditional enemy as 
they had many times in the past. The PAS’s ambitions to be “king maker” 
could not be realised when it won only 18 seats, compared to 21 in 2013. 
Its support remained concentrated in its traditional heartland, and the 
small increase in its popular vote from 14.7 to 16.9 per cent was not ex-
ceptional given that it contested more than twice the number of seats it 
had in 2013 (157 seats as against 73, and on the peninsula143 compared 
to 65). 
The Malay shift to the PH was assisted by non-Malay support. With 
Malays accounting for approximately 61 per cent of the peninsula’s elec-
torate, and notwithstanding extra weighting in favour of Malay electorates, 
non-Malays are sometimes still in a position to tip the balance. In 2018, 
mixed constituencies – where no racial group exceeded 70 per cent of the 
electorate – accounted for 83 seats. The PH won 73 of these (Ong Kian 
Ming 2018). Analysts concur that over 90 per cent of the Chinese vote 

14  On FELDA voters prior to 2018, see for example Saravanamuttu (2017). On the 
2018 election, see Yuen (2018). 
15  DAP MP Ong Kian Ming (2018) notes that “the four parliament seats with more 
than 10,000 early voters (mostly police and army) were all won by Pakatan Hara-
pan.” In his own constituency of Bangi, Selangor, the BN won only 23 per cent 
of the 1,305 postal votes (mostly army).  
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went to the PH, an increase from an estimated 85 per cent in 2013, and 
the party obtained the votes of approximately 70 per cent of Indians (Free 
Malaysia Today 2018b; The Malaysian Insight 2018a).  
It cannot, however, be said that the elections resulted in a govern-
ment dominated by non-Malay/Muslims. One analyst has argued that this 
was so because for the first time non-Muslim parliamentarians outnum-
bered Muslims in the ruling coalition (PH and Warisan) (Kamarul Zaman 
Yusoff 2018a). Malaysia’s leading proponent of Malay-Islamic dominance, 
PAS leader Hadi Awang, has also endorsed this interpretation (The Malay-
sian Insight 2018d). On election night the government had 63 non-Muslim 
MPs, but only 58 Muslims – 27 from PKR, 13 from Bersatu, 11 from 
Amanah, six from Warisan, and one from DAP – comprising 47.9 per cent 
of the total. Post election three non-Muslims joined PKR and three Mus-
lims Bersatu, making 66 non-Muslims and 61 Muslims, with the Muslim 
component 48 per cent. This is somewhat similar to the results of the 1999 
election, when for the first time UMNO received fewer seats than its co-
alition partners (72 of 148, or 48.6 per cent) but 11 Parti Pesaka Bumi-
putera Bersatu representatives in Sarawak lifted the BN Muslim compo-
nent to 83, or 56.1 per cent. However, later resignations of UMNO MPs 
– three of whom have already joined Bersatu, and others have declared 
their support for the PH government – together with the withdrawal of 
all Sarawak and Sabah components of the BN and their affirmations of 
being “PH friendly”, mean that the PH is now effectively a Malay-domi-
nated alliance. And in addition to its success in winning most of the pen-
insular Malay majority seats, PH also had more Malays elected on the pen-
insula than UMNO – 51 (PKR 26, PPBM 13, PAN 11, DAP 1) compared 
to 46. With ten UMNO peninsular representatives subsequently leaving 
the party, three of whom joined PPBM, the figures are now PH 54 and 
UMNO 36. 
Parliament remains a predominantly Malay-Muslim institution. The 
PH and UMNO Malays elected for the peninsula on 9 May totalled 97. To 
this must be added a further 10 Malays elected for the BN in Sarawak, and 
14 in Sabah (7 UMNO, 6 Warisan and one from PRK). In total, 121 mem-
bers (54.5 per cent) of the House of Representatives are Malay/Muslims. 
The cabinet formed after the elections is also overwhelmingly Malay-Mus-
lim: 18 of its 26 members are Malays (69 per cent), and the key posts of 
prime minister and deputy prime minister are held by Malays.  
The final critical electorates in the GE 14 were the once “fixed de-
posit” states of Sabah/Labuan and Sarawak. In the former, the BN won 
23 seats in 2013 but was reduced to 11 in 2018. UMNO seats fell from 15 
to eight. In Sarawak the decline was less marked – as mentioned it was the 
  78 John Funston 

only state where the BN won the popular vote – but still went from 25 to 
19 seats. 
:KDW&DXVHGWKH6KLIW"
A multitude of factors contributed to the GE14’s unexpected outcome. 
The immediate issues raised in the election campaign doubtlessly played a 
part. Analysts agree that the PH focus on the rising cost of living resonated 
with a large number of voters, particularly its emphasis on the GST (see 
for example, The Star 2018a). Similarly, opposition to corruption and gov-
ernance reform attracted wide support. The BN’s claim that this was all 
based on lies was ineffective in an age when detailed contrary evidence 
was widely circulated online. Youth voters were particularly focused on 
such issues, and with 41 per cent of the electorate aged between 21 and 39 
they played an important role (Welsh 2018a: 17). Both sides were actively 
engaged in a cyber war, but the PH message was more compelling. 
The BN made a number of miscalculations. Centring the campaign 
on Najib ignored his deep unpopularity due to multiple corruption scan-
dals, his autocratic rule, and the ostentatious lifestyle he shared with his 
wife. Najib’s omnipresence contrasted unfavourably with scenes of the 
EC cutting out “banned” campaign photos of Mahathir. Other actions by 
the EC and ROS directed against PH appeared excessively vindictive. And 
the three-cornered contest including PAS, which Najib had orchestrated, 
worked more in favour of PH and PAS than the BN.16 
The BN was also out-campaigned by the opposition. The PH was 
able to decide on the allocation of parliamentary seats well before the elec-
tion, and it published its manifesto a month before the BN. Mahathir, al-
ways a skilful election campaigner, was a much more effective communi-
cator than Najib, drawing enthusiastic crowds to his many public talks. 
The alliance between former enemies Mahathir and Anwar Ibrahim 
brought together the two most charismatic Malay leaders, each with com-
mitted followers; neither could have won without the other.  
Viewed in a broader context, the seminal decline of UMNO that 
dates to the reformasi period in the 1990s finally reached a tipping point. 
The emergence of a new critical middle class – including both Malays and 
non-Malays – and the wider availability of alternative information through 
digital means, at a time when 1MDB and other corruption issues reached 

16  UMNO achieved a simple majority for only 13 of its 54 seats, but because of 
three cornered contests won 41 more. PKR and PAS combined won 42 seats 
under similar circumstances: PKR, 33; PAS, 9 (Malaysiakini 2018). 
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unprecedented heights, sealed UMNO’s fate. Najib’s attempt to address 
these issues by an ethnonationalist appeal to the Malay electorate failed 
spectacularly. The vote was in many respects a vote against the BN rather 
than a vote for the PH. As the election results came in Najib did try to 
manoeuvre and cling to power, but the size of PH’s vote, the decision of 
key institutions such as the police and rulers to accept this, and the vigi-
lance of civil society electoral observers brought a peaceful end to the 
BN’s long-standing dominance.  
7KH)XWXUH
Months after the GE14, the UMNO appears to be disintegrating. It has 
lost nearly all its coalition allies. A party assembly in June 2018 saw Najib-
aligned leaders taking most leadership positions and endorsing the same 
failed policies. Najib and new leader Zahid are facing multiple corruption 
charges, and more prosecutions will follow. The means by which UMNO 
exerted control – particularly through use of the coercive powers of the 
state and political patronage – have largely been taken away from it, and 
new more democratic and accountable processes put in place. At the time 
of writing no less than 17 parliamentarians have left the party, along with 
many more at the state assembly level, and virtually the entire leadership 
in Sabah, the state with the largest UMNO membership.17 More resigna-
tions seem likely. In the longer term, the PH-initiated political reform, the 
continuing process of urbanisation, the growth of the middle class, and 
the growing political influence of younger voters – particularly if proposals 
to reduce the voting age to 18 go ahead – will make it extremely difficult 
for UMNO to return. 
Nonetheless, it is too early to write UMNO off. Electoral fortunes 
can change quickly, as illustrated by the fact that the largest party in the 
current parliament, PKR, won only one seat in the 2004 elections. Regime 
change is notoriously difficult, and there have been many missteps and 
conflicts within the new government. The collapse of the PH, or the econ-
omy, could provide opportunities for UMNO’s resurgence in the longer 
term. UMNO remains a party with vast resources, and with leaders who 
have significant experience stoking ethnonationalist fears. But UMNO’s 
future now rests more with the PH government than in its own hands. 
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17  In addition to five MP resignations, two senators, nine assemblypersons, and 21 
of 25 division heads resigned en mass from Sabah UMNO on 12 December. 
Only one of eight UMNO parliamentarians, and one of ten assemblypersons, 
remain with the party. 
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